Oregon ISO Sentenced in $14 Million Unauthorized Debit Scheme

An Oregon ISO, also called a payment processing broker, has been sentenced to three years in federal prison for helping sham merchants retain access to the banking system while they initiated millions of dollars in unauthorized debits.

Jeremy Todd Briley, 47, of Happy Valley, Oregon, was also sentenced to three years of supervised release and ordered to forfeit $460,000 in fraud proceeds. He pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in April 2026, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.

How the unauthorized debit scheme worked

Payment processing brokers help merchants establish relationships with processors and other financial institutions that can move funds through card or bank-payment networks. That access can be difficult for higher-risk merchants to obtain and maintain, particularly when transactions generate excessive complaints or returns.

Federal prosecutors said Briley obtained and maintained payment processing relationships for two sham companies that falsely represented themselves as online marketing businesses. The companies then caused unauthorized debits to be initiated against business bank accounts.

The DOJ attributed more than $14 million in unauthorized and attempted debits to the operation. That figure includes debit attempts and should not automatically be interpreted as the amount of completed losses.

Briley’s role is significant because prosecutors did not portray him as merely introducing a client and walking away. They said he continued helping the companies after repeatedly receiving information that the transactions were not authorized.

The government also said Briley concealed the merchants’ conduct and arranged for a payment processor to manipulate return rates on fraudulent debits. Return rates can serve as an important warning signal because unusually high levels may indicate improper authorizations, deceptive sales practices or outright fraud.

Why the broker’s role mattered

A fraudulent merchant needs more than a customer list and bank account information. It also needs access to processors and financial institutions willing to originate or transmit its transactions.

That makes brokers, independent sales organizations and other payments intermediaries important control points. Their relationships, representations and assistance can help a merchant enter the payment system, and remain there when risk signals begin to accumulate.

The Briley case demonstrates the potential consequences when an intermediary allegedly recognizes those signals but continues preserving the merchant’s access. Criminal exposure does not necessarily require the intermediary to initiate every transaction personally. Knowingly facilitating the operation, concealing its activity, or helping it bypass monitoring systems can create serious liability.

This does not mean legitimate brokers are responsible for every merchant that later files a complaint or initiates an unauthorized return. The critical distinction is knowledge and conduct: what the intermediary learned, how credible the warnings were and what it did after receiving them.

Prison, supervision and forfeiture

U.S. District Judge Roy K. Altman imposed the three-year prison sentence on July 20, 2026. Briley will serve three years of supervised release following imprisonment and must forfeit $460,000.

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Office of Inspector General investigated the case. It was prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida under case number 25-cr-20350.